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[T]his disparity between the salaries of the judicial and legal professions can-
not continue indefinitely without compromising the morale of thefederalJu-
diciary and eventually its quality.
-Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist'
The disparity between the salaries of the judicial and legal profession cannot
continue without compromising the morale of the federal judiciary and even-
tually its quality.
-Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist 2
t B.A., University of California at Irvine, 1999; candidate for J.D., Cornell Law
School, 2002.
1 William H. Rehnquist, The 1996 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, THiRD
BmaNcH (Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts Office of Pub. Affairs),Jan. 1997, at 1, 2 [here-
inafter 1996 Report].
2 Jarrett Murphy, Federal Judges Want Speaking Fees, CBS News.com, at http://
v.cbsnes.com/stories/2000/09/22/national/main235734.html (Sept. 22, 2000).
Though three years had passed, Chief Justice Rehnquist's stated position on perceived
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Of the inadequacy ofjudicial pay I have spoken again and again, without
much result.... I can only refer back to what I have previously said on this
subject.
-Chief Justice William H. RehnquistO
INTRODUCTION
Allegations of judicial bribery or perceived judicial impropriety
instantly attract public attention.4 As final arbiters of the law, our
judges are entrusted by the Constitution and bound by centuries of
tradition to ensure that every citizen receives a fair and impartial
trial,5 regardless of the resources at her or his disposal. Unlike the
lawyers who practice before them, judges are necessarily public ser-
vants, paid from the collective purse to serve a deep and common
social good. It is no wonder, then, that there is a public outcry when-
ever judicial impropriety is exposed.
Responding to longstanding concerns that well-funded private in-
terests had sought to exert improper influence over government offi-
cials, Congress enacted a law that broadly prohibited federal
salary inequities between the private and public sectors remained virtually unchanged.
ChiefJustice Rehnquist's letter of April 27, 2000, to Senator Mitch McConnell was purport-
edly private until September 2000, at which point Senator McConnell released the letter to
the public. See Tony Mauro & Sam Loewenberg, Who Really Wants to Lift Ban on Fees,
LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 18, 2000, at 1. The Chief Justice's letter either suggested or offered
support for a proposal to repeal the statutory ban on honoraria, discussed infra. See id.
3 William H. Rehnquist, The 2001 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, THIRD
BRANCH (Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts Office of Pub. Affairs),Jan. 2002, at 1, 2 [here-
inafter 2001 Report].
4 See infra note 43 and accompanying text; see also Russ Feingold, PassingJudgment on
Honoraria, CHI. TiuB., Sept. 27, 2000, at 21 (arguing that the increase of money in politics
has weakened ethical standards, and that prohibition on honoraria is necessary to protect
the integrity of the federal judiciary); Judges for Hire? Congress Should Not Repeal Ban on
Outside Speaking FeesforJurists, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse, N.Y.), Sept. 21, 2000, at A14 (ar-
guing that the mere appearance of impropriety is damaging to the justice system); Dan
Morgan, Bill Would End Ban on Honoraria forJudges, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 2000, at Al (quot-
ing senior vice president of Common Cause, Meredith McGehee, as saying that the pro-
posed repeal of the 1989 ban on speaking fees forjudges serving a lifetime appointment is
"[t]otally unacceptable and outrageous"); 'Outside Jobs' Inappropriate for Judges, Including
Scalia, PANTAGRAPH BLOOMINGTON, Oct. 9, 2000, at A1O (asserting that judges should not
be able to supplement their income at will and that "[t ] he chances for actual or perceived
conflicts of interest are glaringly obvious to Mr. and Mrs. Average American. They should
be all the more obvious to experienced federal judges."). The purchase of influence is
troubling to the public regardless of the branch of government involved. In discussing
Maryland's Public Ethics Law, William Somerville recently wrote:
If a person on the street were asked to describe a problem in legislative
ethics, the chances are strong that the first thought would be of an influen-
tial lobbyist bestowing valuable gifts on legislators to win votes. It seems
that no other ethics issue resonates as clearly with constituents as the
thought of influence bought with lavish meals, free trips, or cash honoraria
for a brief speech.
William G. Somerville, Ethics and the Citizen Legislature, MD. B.J., Sept./Oct. 2000, at 22, 27.
5 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. V-VI.
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employees from accepting any form of non-governmental compensa-
tion (also known as honoraria) from private benefactors for delivering
speeches, writing articles, or performing other non-work-related
tasks.6 The Ethics Reform Act of 1989, a comprehensive amendment
of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978,7 provided that "[a]n individ-
ual may not receive any honorarium while that individual is a Mem-
ber, officer or employee" of the federal government.8 The Act applies
to executive, legislative, and judicial officers and employees, 9 includ-
ing federal judges under the rubric of 'Judicial officers,"' 0 and their
staffs within the definition of 'Judicial employees.""
However, recent events indicate that influential members of the
Supreme Court would prefer to eliminate the ban as it applies to the
judiciary. On September 18, 2000, Tony Mauro and Sam Loewenberg
first reported on what Washington insiders had dubbed the "Keep
Scalia on the Court" bill-previously confidential contacts between
members of the Supreme Court and Senate Republican leaders that
had culminated in congressional action to overturn the honoraria
prohibition for federal judges.12 Senate Republicans had surrepti-
tiously inserted a provision into a massive 2001 appropriations bill that
would quietly repeal the ban.13 Though the authors never alleged that
Justice Scalia had personally contacted a member of Congress, they
reported that " [f ]lor Scalia, the honoraria ban was one of several fac-
tors that caused him to muse aloud from time to time about leaving
the Court .... Scalia's frustration, as much as anything else, was the
trigger for inclusion [of the] provision lifting the ban on honoraria
for the judiciary."14
6 See Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-194, 103 Stat. 1716, 1760 (codified
as amended at 5 U.S.C. app. § 501(b) (2000)).
7 See Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 101-505 (2000)).
8 5 U.S.C. app. § 501(b). "The term 'honorarium' means a payment of money or
any thing of value for an appearance, speech or article . . . by a Member, officer or em-
ployee .... " Id. app. § 505(3).
9 See id. app. § 101(f).
10 Under 5 U.S.C. app. § 109(10), "judicial officer" refers to "the ChiefJustice of the
United States, the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and the judges of the United
States courts of appeals, United States district courts... [and other courts], the judges of
which are entitled to hold office during good behavior." Id. app. § 109(10).
11 Under 5 U.S.C. app. § 109(8), "judicial employee" refers to:
[A)ny employee of the judicial branch of the Government, of the United
States Sentencing Commission, of the Tax Court, of the Court of Federal
Claims, of the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, or of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, who is not a judicial officer and
who is authorized to perform adjudicatory functions with respect to pro-
ceedings in the judicial branch ....
Id. app. § 109(8).
12 See Mauro & Loewenberg, supra note 2.
13 See H.R. 4690, 106th Cong. § 305 (2000); Morgan, supra note 4.
14 Mauro & Loewenberg, supra note 2.
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Mauro and Loewenberg also reported that Senator Mitch McCon-
nell had received a private letter from Chief Justice Rehnquist in sup-
port of rescinding the ban, a letter which McConnell released to the
public months later.15 The letter led some people to conclude that
the ChiefJustice was the impetus behind the repeal provision. 16 Chief
Justice Rehnquist responded to the accusation by explaining that
"Senator McConnell's staff contacted my office regarding legislation
the Senator planned to introduce to lift or ease the ban on honoraria
for federal judges . .. [and] I responded to Senator McConnell's re-
quest by my letter of April 27." 17 Though the sequence of contacts
between Senator McConnell and Chief Justice Rehnquist is debatable,
the Chief Justice's implicit support for such a provision was otherwise
documented in his 2000 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary. i8
According to reports, Senator McConnell directed the Senate
Republicans' effort. McConnell asked Senator Judd Gregg to intro-
duce the honoraria provision in the Senate Appropriations Subcom-
mittee and then co-sponsored the provision.' 9 Passed by the Senate
Appropriations Committee on July 18, 2000,20 the provision was dis-
covered and publicized by the Washington Post in September,21 imme-
diately leading to a variety of scathing editorials in newspapers across
the country.22 By October, the Senate Select Committee on Ethics
had removed the provision before passing the 2001 appropriations
bill. 23 The sudden, strong opposition from members of the Commit-
tee on Ethics appeared to have resulted from public disclosure of the
concealed provision.24
Though the immediate threat of repeal no longer looms omi-
nously overhead, the provision to lift the honoraria ban received
strong backing from leading Senate Republicans, 25 thereby increasing
the likelihood that legislators might sneak a similar provision in
through another back door. Indeed, there is at least one report that
Senate Republicans are "continuing to insist that the repeal be re-
tained in the final version of next year's appropriations bill for the
15 I1&
16 See Morgan, supra note 4. According to Morgan, ChiefJustice Rehnquist requested
in April 2000 that Congress repeal the honoraria prohibition. Id.
17 Mauro & Loewenberg, supra note 2.
18 See William H. Rehnquist, The 2000 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, THIRD
BRANCH (Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts Office of Pub. Affairs), Jan. 2001, at 1, 1-4
[hereinafter 2000 Report].
19 See Mauro & Loewenberg, supra note 2.
20 See H.R. 4690, 106th Cong. § 305 (2000).
21 See Morgan, supra note 4.
22 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 4.
23 See Eric Pianin, Ban on Honoraria for Judges Stays Intact, WASH. POsr, Oct. 4, 2000, at
A4.
24 Id
25 See Morgan, supra note 4.
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Commerce, Justice and State Departments and thejudiciary.''26 More-
over, Chief Justice Rehnquist's 2000 and 2001 Year-End Reports on
the Judiciary have singled out salary concerns as the single most im-
portant problem facing the federal judiciary. 27 Thus, there remains a
considerable threat that Congress will repeal or perhaps dramatically
alter the honoraria prohibition in the near future, as a less costly alter-
native to raising the salaries of federal judges to correspond with ris-
ing private sector salaries and inflation. Moreover, if members of
Congress attempt to repeal the honoraria prohibition yet again, they
will not need to contact Supreme Court justices in order to ascertain
their opinions on the matter.
This Note argues, however, that although there is a lower direct
cost to the public in permitting federal judges to receive honoraria to
supplement their income, the indirect price-the integrity and inde-
pendence of the judicial branch-will be unacceptably high. The in-
sulation of the judicial branch from private influence plays an
important legitimizing function in our representative democracy. Al-
lowing private influence in the form of honoraria payments will com-
promise the independence of the judiciary by opening the door to
political influence on judicial decisionmaking, or in the least will lead
to the perception that such influence exists. Accordingly, this Note
assesses the impact of a repeal of the honoraria prohibition of the
Ethics Reform Act of 1989 (Reform Act) upon the judicial branch.
Part I briefly explores the recent history of judicial impropriety in the
form of bribery. Part II examines the germane history and provisions
of the Reform Act as currently codified. Part III addresses pertinent
case law regarding the repeal of the ban as it applies to other govern-
ment employees and examines the conflicts that a Supreme Court-
supported honoraria ban repeal has created with the Code of Conduct
for United States Judges. Finally, Part IV argues that the ban should not
be repealed as it applies to federal judges, and analyzes the implica-
tions of the repeal for the future legitimacy of the judicial branch.
I
JUDICIAL IMPROPRITY-THE HONORARIA BAN's LINK
wrM T=E PAST
It is generally agreed that offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting
something of value for the purpose of influencing a public or legal
26 Dan Morgan, Opposition to Ending Honoraria Ban Grows, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2000,
at A19.
27 See 2000 Report, supra note 18, at 1-4; 2001 Report, supra note 3, at 2-3.
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official in the discharge of her duties is bribery28 and is both unethical
and illegal. It is far less clear, however, whether bribery has occurred
when a judge receives payment in exchange for an activity such as
speaking or writing. Nevertheless, the transaction retains a similar un-
ethical taint; a judge is taking money from a person, or a relative of a
person, who may have business before her court. Indeed, some might
argue that permitting private, third parties to pay judges money in
exchange for appearing, speaking, or writing at their behest is tanta-
mount to bribery and is conveniently disguised by the euphemism
"honorarium."
One of the primary reasons behind the enactment of the honora-
ria ban was the distasteful similarity between honoraria payments to
judges and the crime of bribery. 29 Furthermore, high-profile cases of
judicial bribery were under consideration when Congress drafted the
law. In the mid-to-late 1980s, two high-profile trials of federal district
court judges on bribery and perjury charges heightened public aware-
ness of the potential for judicial impropriety. The subsequent House
impeachments and Senate convictions of both judges further scarred
the federal judiciary.
One of those notorious cases was United States v. Nixon.30 After
nearly eighteen years as a federal district court judge, and in the
words of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, "dissatisfied with his mod-
est judicial salary," Walter Nixon sought to purchase an interest in
three oil well properties from a successful investor, Wiley Fairchild,
whose son was prosecuted for participation in a conspiracy to import
marijuana.31 Judge Nixon was accused of arranging lenient treatment
for Fairchild's son in the form of "passing his case to the file," a proce-
dure that usually results in termination of a case.32 The high-profile
prosecution ofJudge Nixon on bribery and perjury charges wound its
way through the courts for six years, as Nixon was accused of ac-
cepting a lucrative investment in exchange for "fixing the system" for
a benefactor's son. In the end, Nixon was convicted on two counts of
perjury, but acquitted on the bribery charge.33 Despite the acquittal,
however, the case left an indelible mark on the public. Moreover,
Nixon subsequently was impeached by the U.S. House of Representa-
28 See BLACK's LAW DicrioNARY 191 (6th ed. 1990). For a theoretical discussion of the
differences between judicial bribery and extortion, see Ian Ayres, The Twin Faces ofJudicial
Corruption: Extortion and Bribery, 74 DENY. U. L. REv. 1231 (1997).
29 One Congressman even equated receipt of honoraria with "legalized bribery." 135
CONG. REC. 29,493 (1989) (statement of Rep. Smith).
30 816 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir. 1987).
31 Id. at 1023-24.
32 Id. at 1024-26.
33 Id. at 1025.
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tives in May 1989,34 convicted, and thereby removed from the bench
by the Senate in November 1989.35 These highly visible proceedings,
along with the simultaneous bribery, perjury, and impeachment pro-
ceedings against U.S. District CourtJudge Alcee Hastings, helped sear
the concept of federal judicial bribery into minds that never before
had considered such turpitude possible in federal courts.
The case againstJudge Hastings was equally serious. Indicted by a
grand jury in 1981, Judge Hastings was accused of conspiring to se-
cure a $150,000 bribe in exchange for sentencing leniency for two
Miami mobsters.36 Acquitted by a jury in a criminal trial, Judge Has-
tings was later impeached by the U.S. House of Representatives for
fabricating evidence to win his acquittal, perjuring himself during the
trial, and for the original underlying bribery-conspiracy charge.37 Al-
though the Senate convicted Judge Hastings of perjury and conspiracy
to accept a bribe, the bribery-conspiracy charge later was overturned
by a district court.38 The conviction was reinstated on remand, how-
ever, in light of Nixon, which held that the Impeachment Trial Clause
rendered the Senate conviction nonjusticiable.39 Unlike Nixon,
whose name was forever tarnished by his trial and impeachment, Has-
tings improbably won election to the House of Representatives for his
Florida congressional district while his impeachment proceedings
were still underway.40 Representative Hastings later became one of
President Clinton's most passionate defenders during the 1998 presi-
dential impeachment proceedings, 41 an irony which drew much pub-
34 135 CONG. REc. H1811 (daily ed. May 10, 1989).
35 135 CONG. REc. 27,104 (1989).
36 Kirk Semple, Crime and Nourishment: In Miami Breaking Bread Has Become an Intricate
Part of Breaking the Law, MiAmi NEw TIMES, Apr. 11, 1996, http://
www.miaminewtimes.com/issues/1996-04-11/feature3.html/1/index.html.
37 135 CONG. REc. 25,328-35 (1989).
38 See Hastings v. United States, 802 F. Supp. 490, 505 (D.D.C. 1992).
39 Hastings v. United States, 837 F. Supp. 3, 5 (D.D.C. 1993) (mem.); Nixon v. United
States, 506 U.S. 224, 226 (1993).
40 See Kenneth J. Cooper, Hastings Joins His Former Accusers: Ousted Judge Takes House
Seat Among Those Who Impeached Him, WASH. PosT, Jan. 6, 1993, at A10; African American
Publications, Alcee Hastings, at http://www.africanpubs.com/apps/bios/0014Hasting-
sAlcee.asp (last visited May 10, 2002).
41 See William E. Gibson, ForAlee Hastings, History Comes Full Circle, SUN-StrTNEL (Fort
Lauderdale, Fla.), Dec. 18, 1998, at 20A, 1998 WL 23473674; William E. Gibson, Ousted
Judge to Make History: Alkee Hastings, Now a Lawmaker, Will Be the First Impeached Official to Vote
on Impeaching a President, ORI.MeNo SENTINEL, Dec. 18, 1998, at A17; Tim Nickens et al.,
Florida on Clinton: Enough Already, ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs, Oct. 11, 1998, at IA.
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lic attention 42 and further reinforced public concern over the
corruption of government officials.43
II
CHECKING THE EXCESSES OF GOVERNMENT OFFIClAis: THE
ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT ACT OF 1978 AND THE
ETHICS REFORM ACT OF 1989
A. The Ethics in Government Act of 1978
As an initial step in addressing public concerns over perceptions
of governmental ethical impropriety, Congress passed the Ethics in
Government Act (EIGA) in 1978 to codify a heightened level of ethics
standards applicable to each of the three branches of the federal gov-
ernment.44 Largely a reaction to the Watergate scandal,45 the goal of
42 See, e.g., Bill Adair & Katherine Pfleger, Like Committee, Forida's Delegates Split Down
Party Lines, ST. PETERSBURG TiMEs, Dec. 12, 1998, at 7A; Greg McDonald, Some Republicans
Mull Impeachment: GOP Leadership Says It's Much Too Soon to Consider Seriously, HOUSTON
CHRON., Jan. 30, 1998, at A12; sources cited supra note 41.
43 The Hastings and Nixon cases are not the only cases involving judges that have
reached the public's awareness. In October 1996, two state superior court judges and an
attorney were convicted ofjudicial corruption when the attorney, Patrick Frega, gave the
judges "$25,000 in gifts in exchange for favored treatment of his cases and special access to
the judges." Alex Roth, Judgment Day Looms in Judicial Bribe Case, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
June 11, 2000, at BI. The prosecutors, arguing that the original sentences should not be
reduced, said, "At this stage of these proceedings, there can be no doubt that defendants
Frega, Adams and Malkus violated the public trust and corrupted both themselves and the
Superior Court of San Diego County." Id. By contrast, Malkus' attorney argued that "the
evidence established only the appearance of impropriety." Valerie Alvord, Ex-Judges, Lawyer
Appeal in Gifts-for-Favors Case, SAN DIEGO UNIoN-TRIB., Jan. 9, 1998, at B3. Frega's lawyer
argued that although gifts were given and received, there was no expectation that a certain
gift would affect a particular case's outcome. The lawyer further argued that "[a] gift
(given with) generalized expectation of ultimate benefit is not a bribe, and a gift motivated
out of friendship to promote good will or a matter unrelated to the official sphere is not a
criminal act." Id. The ease with which lavish gifts, as in the above case, are explained away
as innocent gifts is precisely why honoraria payments are damaging to the legitimacy of the
judicial branch. The bribery scandal was described as "the worst in the history of the San
Diego bench," and resulted in part from the plea bargained testimony of a third judge on
similar bribery charges. See Alex Roth, Ex-Judge, Lawyer Cut Prison Time, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., Nov. 29, 2001, at Al. The judges were tried with the attorney who allegedly bribed
them, and were convicted on mail-fraud and RICO conspiracy charges; the conspiracy
charges were recently reversed on appeal on grounds of instructional error. See United
States v. Frega, 179 F.3d 793 (9th Cir. 1999) (upholding mail fraud and RICO charge
against lawyer Frega and reversing RICO conspiracy charges against all three defendants).
44 See Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 101-505 (2000)).
45 The EIGA was "'a direct outgrowth of the Watergate scandals' and of 'the failure of
the then-Attorney General to prosecute those responsible for the "cover-up" of the initial
burglary.'" Stuart Taylor, Jr., U.S. Judge Orders a Special Inquiry into '80 Campaign, N.Y.
TIMES, May 15, 1984, at Al (quoting U.S. DistrictJudge Harold H. Greene); see also S. REP.
No. 95-170, at 21 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4216, 4237 (citing as a reason for
public financial disclosure that "public confidence in all three branches of the Federal
government has been seriously eroded by the exposure, principally in the course of the
Watergate investigation, of corruption on the part of few high-level government officials"
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the seven-part EIGA was to "implement certain reforms in the opera-
don of the Federal Government and to preserve and promote the in-
tegrity of public officials and institutions . . . of the Federal
Government and to invigorate the Constitutional separation of powers
between the three branches of Government."46
Three of the EIGA's seven sections created independent checks
on the potential for unethical behavior of government employees. 47
Tides I-Il1 of the EIGA required public disclosure of the financial in-
terests of certain employees in the three branches of the federal gov-
ernment.48 Tide IV established an Office of Government Ethics
within the Office of Personnel Management.49 Tide V established re-
strictions on the post-employment activities of officers and employees
of the executive branch of the federal government.50 Tide VI author-
ized the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to appoint,
under certain circumstances, a special prosecutor, and Title VII estab-
lished the Office of Senate Legal Counsel.51
As originally drafted, the EIGA did not prohibit employees of any
branch of the federal government from receiving fees for speaking
engagements, but it did require full disclosure of any honoraria re-
ceived in the form of annual financial disclosure statements. 52 Re-
ports filed by members of the three branches of the federal
government were to be made available to the public within fifteen
days of their disclosure.53 Specifically, the EIGA required the Presi-
dent, the Vice President, members of Congress, justices and judges of
U.S. district courts, and other senior-level government employees to
file financial disclosure statements.5 4
Titles I-HI of the EIGA additionally provided for the sanction of
noncomplying federal government employees.55 The EIGA estab-
lished civil penalties for individuals who knowingly and willfully falsi-
fied or failed to file reports.56 Additionally, the Act provided for the
possibility that "systematic random audits be conducted of financial
and further stating that "[p]ublic financial disclosure was seen as an important step to take
to help restore public confidence in the integrity... [of] the government as a whole.");
Thomas D. Morgan, The Quest for Equality in Regulating the Behavior of Government Officials:
Thw Case of Extrajudicial Compensation, 58 GEo. WASH. L. Rv. 488, 492 (1990) (arguing that
the Watergate scandal created an environment conducive to ethics regulation).
46 S. REP. No. 95-170, at 1 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4216, 4217.
47 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 401-406, 601-604, 701-716 (2000).
48 Id. app. §§ 301-309.
49 Id. app. §§ 401-406.
50 Id. app. §§ 501-503.
51 Id. app. §§ 601-604, 701-716.
52 Id. app. §§ 101-103, 201-203, 301-303.
53 Id. app. §§ 104(a), 205(b), 305(b).
54 Id. app. §§ 101, 201, 301.
55 Id. app. §§ 106, 204, 304.
56 Id- app. §§ 106, 204(a), 304(a).
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disclosure reports"5 7 in order to ensure that the statute was "being
carried out effectively and whether timely and accurate reports [were]
being filed by individuals subject to this title."58
B. The Ethics Reform Act of 1989
The Ethics Reform Act (Reform Act) made important changes to
the existing Ethics in Government Act of 1978. 59 The stated purpose
of the new legislation was "to amend the Rules of the House of Repre-
sentatives and the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 to provide for
Government-wide ethics reform, and for other purposes."60 Perhaps
most significantly, the Reform Act followed on the heels of enormous
income increases that members of Congress received in the form of
honoraria payments. According to one report, "[M]embers of Con-
gress received $9.1 million in honoraria fees in 1988."61 The most
impressive outcome of the Reform Act was a limitation on receipt of
gifts by federal employees while holding office. 62 The Reform Act left
the EIGA largely intact; Title II of the Reform Act, for example,
closely parallels the first three titles of the EIGA. 63 Indeed, the report-
ing requirements are identical-every financial disclosure must in-
clude "the source, date, and amount of honoraria from any source."64
While some commentators have criticized the addition of the gift limi-
tation-the honoraria prohibition-for its over-inclusion of all federal
57 Id. app. § 109(b).
58 Id. app. § 109(a).
59 Compare Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-194, 103 Star. 1716, with Ethics
of Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824.
60 103 Stat. at 1716.
61 Michael H. Chang, Protecting the Appearance of Propriety: The Policies Underlying the
One-Year Ban on Post-Congressional Lobbying Employment, KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, Winter 1996,
at 121, 127 n.31. Chang argues that receipt of honoraria
contribute[s] to the appearance of impropriety in Congress. Special inter-
ests have legally given millions of dollars each year in honoraria fees and
political action committee (PAC) contributions to obtain access and influ-
ence on the Hill.... Sixty Senators and eighty-one Representatives in the
1989 Congress have pocketed more than $100,000 each during the period
from 1983-88.
Id. (citing Press Release, Common Cause, Total House and Senate Honoraria (Aug.
1989)).
62 According to one scholar, "[R]egulations governing gifts are among the ethics
code's most important provisions. They address a fundamental and abiding symbol of gov-
ernment gone astray. The use of public office for private gain undermines public confi-
dence that official action fairly reflects the outcome of democratic processes." Seth D.
Zinman, Judging Gift Rules by Their Wrappings--Towards a Clearer Articulation of Federal Em-
ployee Gift-Acceptance Rules, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 141, 159 (1994). Zinman's article contains a
broad discussion of gift regulations.
63 Compare § 202, 103 Stat. at 1724-44, with §§ 101-109, 201-211, 301-309, 92 Stat. at
1824-61.
64 Compare § 102(a) (1) (A), 103 Stat. at 1727, with §§ 102(a) (1) (A), 202 (a) (1) (A),
302(a) (1) (A), 92 Stat. at 1825, 1837-38, 1851.
[Vol. 87:14751484
2002] THE SUPREME COURT'S INDECENT PROPOSAL
employees,65 few have commented on the import of the prohibition
for the federal judiciary.
The most significant difference between the Reform Act and the
EIGA was the transformation of Title V of the EIGA, which originally
dealt with restrictions on post-employment activities of executive
branch employees. Title VI of the Reform Act, entitled "Limitations
on Outside Employment and Elimination of Honoraria,"66 modified
Tite V of the EIGA by adding several limitations on earned income
applicable to the three branches of the federal government, including
a prohibition on the receipt of honoraria by any member, officer, or
employee of the federal government.67 Although such persons can-
not personally receive honoraria, the Reform Act allows a potential
recipient to donate to charity any money-below a $2,000 cap-that
otherwise would have been paid to the employee. 68
Congress passed the Ethics Reform Act in 1989 after assessing the
results of an extensive study by an intergovernmental task force. 69 In
his capacity as a member of the House of Representatives, Vic Fazio
served on the task force and recalled that at the time of enactment,
the task force "couldn't justify the implication if not the reality that
[honoraria] were influencing decisions. °70 Prior to the enactment of
the Reform Act, judges and other government officials were receiving
tens of thousands of dollars a year from special interest groups in ex-
change for appearances and speeches.7'
65 The majority of the academic debate has centered on the question of whether fi-
nancial restrictions infringe upon free speech rights. See Ivy B. Cubell, Note, Banning the
Sale of Witness Testimony: A First Amendment Challenge to California Penal Code Section 132.5, 75
B.U. L. REv. 1135, 1150 (1995) (arguing that a statute "is presumptively inconsistent with
the First Amendment if it imposes a financial burden on speakers based upon the content
of their speech"). Some have argued that, at least with respect to low- and mid-level pro-
spective federal employees, surrendering First Amendment rights may be seen as a condi-
tion of employment because of the Reform Act's broad honoraria prohibition. See Robert
S. Collins, Ethics and the First Amendment: The Applicability of the Honorarium Ban of the Ethics
Reform Act of 1989 to the Executive Branch, 62 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 888, 919 (1994). The
courts seem to be in agreement with this point, at least as it relates to the off-duty activities
of lower-level federal employees. See infra Part III.B.
66 See § 601, 103 Stat. at 1760-62.
67 Id.
68 Title VI of the Reform Act provides that
[a]ny honorarium which, except for subsection (b), might be paid to a
Member, officer or employee, but which is paid instead on behalf of such
Member, officer or employee to a charitable organization, shall be deemed
not to be received by such Member, officer or employee. No such payment
shall exceed $2,000 ....
Id.
69 See Morgan, supra note 26.
70 Id.
71 Id.; see also Mauro & Loewenberg, supra note 2 (noting thatJustice Scalia received
$37,000 in honoraria in 1989).
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While many federal officials considered their salaries to be un-
necessarily inadequate, the Reform Act largely evoked the third-party
supplementation of salaries.72 Federal salaries, however, would con-
tinue to be examined and adjusted where appropriate. In 1967, Con-
gress established a special working group, the Quadrennial
Commission, to deal with executive, legislative, and judicial salaries. 73
The principal function of the Commission, which meets every four
years, is to recommend appropriate compensation levels for the top
positions in each branch of the federal government.74 The Quadren-
nial Commission's 1989 report noted: "We have found that present
salary levels stated in constant dollars are approximately 35% less than
the salary levels fixed for the same positions in 1969. Thus, our top
federal officials have seen their salaries severely eroded by inflation. '75
The report additionally found that "because their salaries are so inad-
equate, many members of Congress are supplementing their official
compensation by accepting substantial amounts of 'honoraria' for
meeting with interest groups who desire to influence their votes."76
Justice Stevens stated that "[t]he Report of the 1989 Quadrennial
Commission... was instrumental in leading to the enactment of the
Ethics Reform Act of 1989." 77
During the first Bush Administration, the President's Commis-
sion on Federal Ethics Law Reform concurred with the Quadrennial
Commission's findings that a salary increase was in order, and con-
cluded that federal judges, members of Congress, and other senior
government officials should be prohibited from making speeches or
appearances paid for by interest groups.78 It was later explained that
"panel member and former Attorney Gen [eral] Griffin Bell summed
up public concern about the source of the big honoraria checks being
collected by judges and other federal officials: 'People wonder who's
paying all these honoraria.' ' 79 The public was becoming suspicious
72 See United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 457-58 (1995);
FAIRNESS FOR OUR PUBLIC SERVANTS: REPORT OF THE 1989 COMMISSION ON EXECUTIVE, LEGIS-
LATIVE ANDJUDICIAL SALARIES 1-4 (1988) [hereinafter FAIRNESS FOR OUR PUBLIC SERVANTS];
David Broder, Fiasco Leaves Wright Vulnerable to Coup, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 17,
1989, at 3B; Phil Gailey, Bush Plan on Ethics Sidesteps Honoraria, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Apr.
13, 1989, at IA; Colman McCarthy, The Pay Raise Doesn't Play, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 1989, at
F2.
73 Federal Salary Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-206, § 225, 81 Stat. 613, 642 (codified at
2 U.S.C. §§ 351-364 (2000)).
74 2 U.S.C. § 356.
75 FAIRNESS FOR OUR PUBLIC SERVANTS, supra note 72, at (v).
76 Id. at (vi).
77 Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. at 457 (footnote omitted).
78 See To SERVE WITH HONOR: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON FEDERAL
ETHICS LAW REFORM 36 (1989); Feingold, supra note 4.
79 Feingold, supra note 4.
1486 [Vol. 87:1475
2002] THE SUPREME COURT'S INDECENT PROPOSAL
that those who paid honoraria might also influence judges in the exe-
cution of their judicial duties.80
Although Congress did not adopt the Commission's recommen-
dations in their original form, the recommendations did figure promi-
nently in the Ethics Reform Act of 1989. Section 703 of the Reform
Act provided a twenty-five percent sizeable one-time salary increase for
members of Congress, federal judges, and for high-ranking executive
branch employees above a certain salary grade.81 Section 601(a) of
the Reform Act amended the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 by
creating the "Honoraria Prohibition," which firmly states that "[a]n
individual may not receive any honorarium while that individual is a
Member, officer or employee. '82 However, under the current law,
federal judges may earn up to $21,195 per year in outside income,
which may come solely from teaching activities.83
The honoraria prohibition was accompanied by a substantial sal-
ary increase for members of each branch, which increase resulted in a
total compensation level equivalent to their old salaries and an
amount they otherwise might have received in honoraria.84 Further-
more, certain government employees were not prohibited from en-
gaging in limited educational activities that could modestly
supplement their salaries. 85 In effect, Congress attempted to substi-
tute untainted income for that which judges and other high-ranking
government officials had been receiving from interest groups; 86 how-
ever, the raise did not adequately compensate judges for what they
were about to lose. Soon after the enactment of the Reform Act,
80 See generally id. (discussing the public's suspicions regarding honoraria); Philip She-
non, Ethics Unit Asks Ban on Fees for Speeches by U.S. Officials, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1989, at B6
(referring to critics who describe honoraria as "ill-disguised attempts to buy influence").
81 See Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-194, § 703, 103 Stat. 1716, 1768.
82 § 601, 103 Stat. at 1760.
The term "Member" means a Representative in, or a Delegate or Resident
Commissioner to, the Congress.... The term "officer or employee" means
any officer or employee of the Government except (A) any individual
(other than the Vice President) whose compensation is disbursed by the
Secretary of the Senate or (B) any special Government employee (as de-
fined in section 202 of title 18, United States Code).
Id at 1761-62.
83 See Morgan, supra note 4. Notably, federal judges have found creative means to
exercise the teaching exception. Recent advertisements in law student magazines have
offered students opportunities to take summer sojourns with Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy in various exotic foreign countries. See Study Abroad Ad-
vertisements, in STUDENT Lw., Feb. 2001, at 5, 42, 43. The Reform Act creates an excep-
tion to the honoraria prohibition for all expenses related to traveling, including
transportation, food, and lodging. See § 302, 103 Stat. at 1745-46 (codified as amended at
31 U.S.C. § 1353 (1994)).
84 See 135 CONG. Rac. 29,500 (1989) (statement of Rep. Stenholm).
85 See § 601, 103 Stat. at 1761.
86 See Collins, supra note 65, at 891.
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lower-level employees of the executive and judicial branches brought
suit to enjoin enforcement of the prohibition as it applied to them.87
The scope of the Reform Act has drawn criticism from those
outside the judiciary.88 At least one commentator, Thomas Morgan,
claims that comprehensive ethics legislation does more harm than
good.8 9 He argues that such legislation is harmful because the cir-
cumstances faced by each branch of government, as well as the cir-
cumstances of employees within each branch, differ significantly
enough that a universal prohibition cannot possibly accommodate
these differences. 90 For example, while almost $10 million was collec-
tively given to Congress in the form of honoraria in 1987, the money
was not evenly distributed among its members.91 Legislators holding
powerful offices within Congress were by far the largest recipients of
honoraria.92 This argument implies that the prohibition of honoraria
is more effective when applied to high-ranking government officials
who have a greater ability to affect the outcome of legislation or trials.
87 See Williams v. United States, 48 F. Supp. 2d 52 (D.D.C. 1999); United States v. Nat'l
Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995).
88 See, e.g., Collins, supra note 65, at 914-15, 918 (recommending that judges imply a
nexus test" in interpreting the Reform Act when considering the receipt of honoraria by
government employees, and suggesting that the broad ban's "burden on the speech of
government employees" might be unconstitutional); Lisa Malloy Nardini, Comment,
Dishonoring the Honorarium Ban: Exemption for Federal Scientists, 45 Am. U. L. REv. 885,
902-03, 909 (1996) (arguing that the coverage of lower-level government employees, such
as government scientists, is unsuitably comprehensive).
89 See Morgan, supra note 45. Morgan writes:
Seen as an imperfect attempt at regulation instead of as an implementation
of imperishable morality, government ethics standards can be understood
as capable of doing more harm than good. All regulation, however well
intentioned, has side effects. It often discourages beneficial conduct as well
as the behavior against which it was originally directed.
Id. at 491.
90 Id. at 493. Indeed, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that the differences in
the offices held by various government employees is a relevant consideration. See Nat'l
Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. at 469.
91 See Morgan, supra note 45, at 493.
92 Id. ("Congressman Dan Rostenkowski, chairman of the House Ways and Means
Committee . . . reportedly received $245,000 in the year in which tax reform was high on
Congress's agenda."). Other influential and high-ranking members of Congress receiving
substantial funds in the form of honoraria include former House SpeakersJim Wright and
Newt Gingrich. See Tom Kenworthy, Wright: Raise Salaries and End Honoraria, WASH. PosT,
Aug. 2, 1988, at A5 (reporting that Wright received "more than $60,000 in royalties from
sales of a book he wrote, 'Reflections of a Public Man,'" and that this payment "is one of
the issues under investigation by the ethics committee"); see also Walter V. Robinson, F/uny
of Ethical Issues in Washington Prompts Hard Look at Business as Usua BOSTON GLOBE, Mar.
26, 1989, at 1 (noting that "Wright's principal accuser, Rep. Newt Gingrich of Georgia,
now stands charged with putting together a questionable deal for his own book," and re-
porting that "Gingrich, a Republican, privately raised $105,000 from conservative support-
ers, money that was used to pay the book's promotion costs and give the investors a tax
break and his wife $10,000 in income"). Receipt of gifts was also observed at the state level.
SeeJeffrey L. Rabin, Shotgun, Cinnamon Buns and Trip to Rio Were Among Gifts to Lawmakers in
1988, L.A. TIMEs, Mar. 5, 1989, at 4, 1989 WL 2329615.
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In addition to the argument that a comprehensive ethics regula-
tion is of little utility, it can also be argued that Congress gave inade-
quate thought to the inclusion of the judiciary in the honoraria
prohibition. It is evident from the congressional record that applying
the ban to the judiciary was only a last minute consideration during
the debate on the honoraria prohibition.93 Congress's failure to con-
sider the judiciary in the debate was a result of its concentration on
the impropriety, or perceived impropriety, of members of Congress.94
The shadow of Watergate undoubtedly motivated Congress to restore
public confidence in executive branch officials as well.
III
SANCTIONING HONORARIA: ETHICAL AND LEGAL CHALLENGES
Judges in the United States are held to a high level of ethical
scrutiny, in part because of their central roles in deciding the out-
comes of trials that may affect many people and that may have a signif-
icant effect on legislative enactments. Viewed from this perspective,
even the appearance of judicial impropriety may erode public confi-
dence in the ability of the judicial branch to adjudicate in a fair and
unbiased manner. Proven offenses such as judicial bribery, for exam-
ple, instantly capture public attention and generate a tremendous
amount of popular disdain. 95 There is a thin line between bribery
and honoraria, and lawmakers tread that line cautiously. Both the le-
gal and ethical challenges attending honoraria are discussed at length
in Part III.
Section A examines the current ethical rules governing judges as
embodied in the Code of Conduct for United States Judges. This body of
law proscribes the commission of any action that creates the appear-
ance ofjudicial impropriety. Next, Section B discusses the major cases
that have dealt with the honoraria prohibition. Specifically, United
States v. National Treasury Employees Union96 addressed the federal law
as it applied to government employees other than federal judges. Of
particular significance to this section is the dissent by Justices Rehn-
quist and Scalia in National Treasury Employees Union, which repealed
the ban as it applied to lower-level government officials.97 Addition-
ally, Williams v. United States9 8 is a particularly germane case in which
93 See, e.g., 135 CONG. REc. 29,703 (1989) (statement of Sen. Mitchell); 135 CONG.
REc. H8746-47 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1989) (statement of Rep. Fazio); see Collins, supra note
65, at 893.
94 See sources cited supra note 92.
95 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
96 513 U.S. 454 (1995).
97 Id. at 489-503.
98 48 F. Supp. 2d 52 (D.D.G. 1999), rev'd, 240 F.3d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
122 S. Ct. 1221 (2002). Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari, yet anotherjus-
1489
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
federal judges attempted, although ultimately unsuccessfully, to get
their salaries raised without the use of honoraria.
A. The Limitations of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges
In addition to the Reform Act, there are other sources of law that
also could regulate judicial receipt of honoraria. Even if there were
no federal law prohibiting honoraria, the Code of Conduct for United
States JudgeP9 would likely govern such financial activities of judges.
Under its current language, however, it would not necessarily barjudi-
cial receipt of honoraria.100 Similar to the codes of professional con-
duct adopted for attorneys by various state bar associations, the Code of
Conduct for United States Judges is not self-enforcing, and violation of its
provisions is not necessarily illegal; rather, the judicial code is en-
forced by the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Dis-
ability Act of 1980,101 and violations may result in professional
sanctions.102
Based upon the 1972 ABA Code ofJudicial Conduct, the Code of Con-
duct for United States Judges embodies the ethical standards for judicial
conduct both on and off the bench.'03 Unlike the 1990 Model Code of
tice-Stephen Breyer, with a passionate dissent to the denial of certiorari-added weight
to the vociferous requests from other Supreme Court justices for judicial salary increases.
122 S. Ct. 1226-28 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
99 CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATESJUDGES (Office of the Gen. Counsel, Admin.
Office of the U.S. Courts 1997) [hereinafter CODE OF CONDUCr].
100 The Code of Conduct for United States Judges adopted the ABA Code ofJudicial Conduct
of 1972, which does not follow the revised 1990 Model Code ofJudicial Conduct, which cre-
ated a much stricter standard than that provided by the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct of
1972. Canon 4 of the 1990 Model Code ofJudicial Conduct is similar to the original Canons 4
and 5 created in 1972. The original Canons were essentially positive, with Canon 4 discuss-
ing permissible avocational activities and Canon 5 detailing permissible quasi-judicial activ-
ities. See CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT Canons 4-5 (1972). Ajudge was permitted to engage
in such activities subject only to the limitations that those activities did not "detract from
the dignity of his office or interfere with the performance of his judicial duties" or "cast
doubt on his capacity to decide impartially any issue that may come before him." Id. Ca-
non 5. Thus, the Canons permitted a judge to "write, lecture, teach, and speak on non-
legal subjects, and engage in the arts, sports, and other social and recreational activities" so
long as he complied with the Code. Id. The revised 1990 Model Code ofJudicial Conduct, by
contrast, specifies the activities a judge may not engage in, thereby applying a narrower
and stricter standard than the one applied by the currentjudicial code of conduct. Compare
MODEL CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT Canons 4-5 (1990), with CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canons 4-5.
101 28 U.S.C. §§ 332(d) (1), 372(c) (1994).
102 See id. § 372(c) (6).
103 Even the drafters of the ABA Code ofJudicial Conduct however, recognized that pay-
ment to judges by private parties creates illicit opportunities, and therefore they sought to
provide ethical guidelines for such activities. One alarming aspect of the Code of Conduct is
that it does not apply to the justices of the Supreme Court. The introduction of the Code
states:
This Code applies to United States CircuitJudges, DistrictJudges, Court of
International Trade Judges, Court of Federal Claims Judges, Bankruptcy
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Judicial Conduct, which, by its terms, prohibited specific forms of inap-
propriate conduct, 10 4 the standards in the Code of Conduct for United
States Judges are comprised of seven Canons describing, permissively,
what a judge may and should do.10 5
The first two Canons of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges
set the permissive stage for the rest, acting as general guidelines for
any activity, judicial or otherwise, in which ajudge might engage. The
first sentence of Canon 1 forcefully declares that "[a]n independent
and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society."'106
Sections A and B of Canon 2 are also noteworthy. Section A admon-
ishes that "[a] judge should respect and comply with the law and
should act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."'0 7 Section B states that
"[a] judge should not lend the prestige of the judicial office to ad-
vance the private interests of others; nor convey or permit others to
convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence
thejudge.' 'l0 8 In Canon 2, the drafters of the Code of Conduct for United
States Judges emphasized the importance of the perception of the judi-
cial branch as objective and impartial, and sought to circumscribe be-
havior that might undermine the legitimacy of the branch.10 9 The
Judges, and Magistrate Judges. Certain provisions of this Code apply to spe-
cial masters and commissioners as indicated in the "Compliance" section.
In addition, the Tax Court, Court of Veterans Appeals, and Court of Ap-
peals for the Armed Forces have adopted this Code.
CODE OF CONDUC, supra note 99, at 1. Thus, without the current ban on honoraria, Su-
preme Court justices are essentially unrestricted in situations where a third party offers
payment to one of them. Although ChiefJustice Rehnquist would like to supplement cost-
of-living increases with other means of compensation for federal judges, permitting the
receipt of honoraria as a source of income supplementation is especially inappropriate
when the result could be differential treatment among federal judges because Supreme
Court justices are not bound by the same Code that applies to lower-level federal judges.
104 See supra note 100.
105 See CODE OF CONDUCr, supra note 99. The seven Canons, with the first, second, and
fifth being most relevant here, are: "Canon 1: A Judge Should Uphold the Integrity and
Independence of the Judiciary," id. Canon 1; "Canon 2: AJudge Should Avoid Impropriety
and the Appearance of Impropriety in All Activities," id. Canon 2; "Canon 3: A Judge
Should Perform the Duties of the Office Impartially and Diligently," id. Canon 3; "Canon
4: A Judge May Engage in Extra-Judicial Activities to Improve the Law, the Legal System,
and the Administration ofJustice," id. Canon 4; "Canon 5: AJudge Should Regulate Extra-
Judicial Activities to Minimize the Risk of Conflict with Judicial Duties," id. Canon 5; "Ca-
non 6: AJudge Should Regularly File Reports of Compensation Received for Law-Related
and Extra-Judicial Activities," id. Canon 6; "Canon 7: AJudge Should Refrain from Political
Activity," id. Canon 7.
106 Id. Canon 1.
107 Id. Canon 2(A).
108 Id. Canon 2(B).
109 See id. Canon 2. The commentary of Canon 1 is illuminating: "Deference to the
judgments and rulings of courts depends upon public confidence in the integrity and inde-
pendence ofjudges. The integrity and independence ofjudges depend in turn upon their
acting without fear or favor." Id. Canon 1 cmt.
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first two Canons establish the foundation for the entirety of the Code of
Conduct for United States Judges and set a standard with which the other
sections of the Code must comport.110
Canon 5 is comprised of eight sections, each describing the con-
duct expected of judges in various outside activities. This Canon ad-
dresses avocational activities and specifies, permissively, that "[a]
judge may write, lecture, teach, and speak ... if such avocational activ-
ities do not detract from the dignity of the judge's office or interfere
with the performance of the judge's judicial duties.""' Although this
section of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges is a direct grant of
permission to engage in the enumerated activities, it is noteworthy
that judges are warned at the beginning of this Canon of the addi-
tional limitations throughout the Canon to which they must adhere.
The general prescription at the beginning of the Canon is one such
limitation. Thus, if ajudge's teaching activities on the French Riviera,
for example, somehow interfered with the performance of herjudicial
duties, she would violate the Code of Conduct for United States Judges.
Most relevantly, Canon 5 only indirectly addresses the collection
of honoraria for speaking or writing. 112 For example, section C(4)
merely states that "[a] judge should not solicit or accept anything of
value from anyone seeking official action from or doing business with
the court or other entity served by the judge, or from anyone whose
interests may be substantially affected by the performance or nonper-
formance of official duties."113 It is hard to imagine a situation in
which a third party could make payments to a judge without creating
even the appearance of impropriety.114 The passage of the Reform
Act's outright ban on judicial honoraria, enacted by the popularly-
elected national legislature, may be the clearest evidence that a rea-
sonable person would see impropriety in ajudge's receipt of such pay-
ments from a third party.
In contrast to the ABA Code ofJudicial Conduct of 1972, the revised
1990 Model Code ofJudicial Conduct took a harder line on specific forms
110 See id. Canons 1-2.
111 Id. Canon 5(A).
112 See id. Canon 5.
113 Id. Canon 5(C) (4). Regarding the issue of honoraria, the 1990 Model Code ofJudi-
cial Conduct is more clear: "A judge may receive compensation and reimbursement of ex-
penses for the extra-judicial activities permitted by this Code, if the source of such
payments does not give the appearance of influencing the judge's performance ofjudicial
duties or otherwise give the appearance of impropriety." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CON-
DUCT Canon 4(H) (1) (1990). This part of Canon 4 of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct
does not absolutely prohibit the receipt of honoraria. However, the standard set up by the
Model Code ofJudicial Conduct for receipt of honoraria is difficult to meet, and whether a
complete congressional repeal of the prohibition would comply with the Model Code ofJudi-
cial Conduct is questionable.
114 It was apparently hard to imagine this at the time of the drafting of the Ethics in
Government Act of 1978. See supra notes 4, 86 and accompanying text.
1492 [Vol. 87:1475
2002] THE SUPREME COURT'S 1KDECENT PROPOSAL
of potentially inappropriate behavior. Notably, though, the federal
judiciary has not adopted the 1990 Model Code of Judicial Conduct.115
The 1990 Model Code ofJudicial Conduct specifically addresses the issue
of honoraria, as the commentary to Canon 4(H) explains:
The Code does not prohibit a judge from accepting honoraria or
speaking fees provided that the compensation is reasonable and
commensurate with the task performed. A judge should ensure,
however, that no conflicts are created by the arrangement. Ajudge
must not appear to trade on the judicial position for personal ad-
vantage. Nor should ajudge spend significant time away from court
duties to meet speaking or writing commitments for compensation.
In addition, the source of the payment must not raise any question
of undue influence or the judge's ability or willingness to be
impartial. 16
By directly addressing the issue of honoraria, the Model Code ofJudicial
Conduct provides specific guidelines that judges should follow when
engaging in the activity. Although the Canons would-in the absence
of the present honoraria ban-offer wiggle room for judges accused
of honorarium impropriety, the Model Code of Judicial Conduct is dis-
tinct from the Code of Conduct for United States Judges by specifically de-
tailing the behavior expected of judges in the event that they do
accept honoraria. Neither the Model Code nor the Code of Conduct is
optimal, however; under the Model Code, judges would be allowed to
perform their own conflict checks, set their own rates of compensa-
tion limited only by the ambiguities of "reasonableness," and spend
time away from court duties subject only to the uncertain standard of
"significance."
In contrast to both of these codes, which represent the current
federal ethical standards, the subsequently enacted federal law clearly
and forcefully mandates that judges should not and may not accept
honoraria. Read in its entirety, the Code of Conduct does not proscribe
the receipt of honoraria; in this case federal law is more developed
than current ethical standards. Although the Code of Conduct so cir-
cumscribes the receipt of honoraria as to make clear that judges can-
not accept that which has an apparent taint of impropriety, a standard
which effectively requires a judge to disgorge once an accusation of
taint has been raised, the federal law affirmatively prevents the taint
from even occurring in the first place.
Violations of the Code of Conduct are sanctioned by the Judicial
Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980
115 See Morgan, supra note 45, at 492 (noting that the life tenure of federal judges
makes any remedy short of impeachment problematic from an enforcement standpoint).
116 MODEL CODE OFJUDICIAL CoNDucr Canon 4(H) cmt.
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(Act),117 a controversial attempt by Congress to permit punishing fed-
eral judges for committing unethical acts without resorting to the con-
stitutionally specified step of impeachment. 118 Thus, when a judge
fails to conform to the prescriptions mandated by the Code of Conduct,
disciplinary action may first be sought under the Act. The Act details
the process a federal judge who is accused of prejudicial conduct must
undergo to answer the charges leveled against him. It provides that:
Any person alleging that a circuit, district, or bankruptcy judge, or a
magistrate, has engaged in conduct prejudicial to the effective and
expeditious administration of the business of the courts... may file
with the clerk of the court of appeals for the circuit a written com-
plaint containing a brief statement of the facts constituting such
conduct.119
If the chiefjudge 120 of the circuit in which the accused judge sits finds
the complaint meritorious, he may conduct additional investigations
or "take such action as is appropriate to assure the effective and expe-
ditious administration of the business of the courts within the cir-
cuit."'2 1 The Act then lists seven disciplinary actions the chief judge
may take against the accused judge. 122
117 Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 331, 332,
372, 604 (1994)).
118 The debate over the constitutionality of the Judicial Council's Reform andJudicial
Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 is, at this point, largely academic. Several scholars have
questioned whether the Act, providing as it does for punishment outside of the constitu-
tionally specified impeachment of judges, violates the Constitution's separation of powers
doctrine. See, e.g., Drew E. Edwards, Judicial Misconduct and Politics in the Federal System: A
Proposal for Revising the Judicial Councils Ac 75 CAL. L. REv. 1071, 1079 (1987) (criticizing
the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 for the "wide
discretion [given] to chief judges, judicial councils, and the Judicial Conference in disci-
plining federal judges," and stating that "[t]he reach of [the Act's] provisions poses the
crucial question of whether it unconstitutionally infringes on either the limits placed on
the causes for impeachment under [A] rticle II [or] the judge's right to tenure under
[A]rticle III"); Steven W. Gold, Temporary Criminal Immunity for Federal Judges: A Constitu-
tional Requirement, 53 BRooK. L. REV. 699, 699 (1987) (arguing that "prosecution of federal
judges undermines thejudiciary's independence by subjecting it to the very pressures that
Article III was drafted to prevent," and that "impeachment is the only constitutional
method for removing a federal judge, and that criminal prosecution, because it constitutes
de facto removal, is unconstitutional if conducted prior to removal by impeachment").
However, at least four circuit courts have independently held that pre-impeachment crimi-
nal prosecutions of judges are entirely permissible. See McBryde v. Comm. to Review Cir-
cuit Council Conduct, 264 F.3d 52, 65-66 (D.C. Cir. 2001); United States v. Claiborne, 727
F.2d 842, 845 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Hastings, 681 F.2d 706, 710 (lth Cir. 1982);
United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1142-44 (7th Cir. 1974).
119 94 Stat. at 2036 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) (1) (1994)).
120 If the accused is the chiefjudge himself, the clerk of the court shall give the com-
plaint "to that circuitjudge in regular active service next senior in date of commission." 28
U.S.C. § 372(c) (2).
121 Id. § 372(c)(6)(B).
122 See id. § 372(c) (6) (B) (i)-(vii).
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The Act grants wide discretion to chief judges and judicial com-
mittee and council members in disciplining federal justices for im-
proper conduct.' 23 This poses a problem when the grant of power is
viewed against the backdrop of the request made by the Chief Justice
of the U.S. Supreme Court for the repeal of the honoraria ban.124 It
strains credulity to think that, in the face of the ChiefJustice's request
for repeal of the ban, circuit court judges will voluntarily discipline
judges for accepting payment from third parties, even though the Code
of Conduct for United States Judges prohibits any activity that "cast[s] rea-
sonable doubt on the capacity to decide impartially any issue that may
come before thejudge."'125 It seems logical that lower-level judges will
view the Chief Justice's request as a statement that honoraria do not
pose ethical problems for judges.
Furthermore, the current federal law prohibition might be most
useful precisely because it brings within its coverage all federal judges,
including the otherwise self-governing justices of the Supreme Court.
As previously stated, the Code of Conduct for United States Judges does not
apply to Supreme Court justices. Thus, in the absence of the current
honoraria ban, Supreme Courtjustices would be virtually unlimited in
accepting payment from private third parties for appearing, speaking,
or writing on their behalf. This lack of limitation is especially signifi-
cant in light of the rather vociferous complaints of the Chief Justice
and others currently on the bench. It is likely that these justices will
indulge in accepting honoraria, if given the chance.
However, there may be reason to believe the justices will act with
some restraint. In asking, "Who Judges the Supreme Court Justices,"
Professor Victor Williams notes:
[A]Ithough the Supreme Court is not bound by the Judicial Confer-
ence's Code of Conduct for United States Judges, the Commission
"has been informed that the Court and the Justices use it for gui-
dance on applicable ethical standards...." Additionally, the Com-
mission was informed that the Chief Justice is said to exercise
'supervisory authority over the Court's adherence" to the standards
of the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, and further, that the Justices had
agreed to "comply with the substance ofJudicial Conference regula-
123 If the chiefjudge does not either dismiss a complaint lodged against anotherjudge
or find that appropriate corrective measures have already been taken, the Act requires the
chief judge to appoint a "special committee to investigate the facts and allegations con-
tained in the complaint" for further investigation and to determine appropriate discipli-
nary action. Id. § 372(c) (4)-(6).
124 See Mauro & Loewenberg, supra note 2.
125 CODE OF CoNDuc, supra note 99, Canon 4.
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tions concerning outside earned income, honoraria, and outside
employment."12 6
Although the Supreme Court is not legally bound by the Code of Con-
duct for United States Judges, there is reason to believe that it offers at
least a modicum of guidance for the justices. One question remains,
however: Who exercises supervisory authority over the Chief Justice's
ethical conduct? The Code of Conduct for United StatesJudges is not to be
taken lightly, nor is there reason to suspect that judges take it lightly.
However, the explicit and stricter standard of the current law is pre-
ferred to the weaker, and easily traversed, standard of the ethical
code.
B. The Court Speaks: Federal Employees, Inadequate Pay, and
Honoraria
The Ethics Reform Act of 1989's universally applicable prohibi-
tion on federal employees' receipt of honoraria was ephemeral. In
United States v. National Treasury Employees Union,12 7 two unions and sev-
eral career civil servants employed by the executive branch and classi-
fied below grade GS-16128 brought an action challenging the
constitutionality of a section of the Ethics Reform Act of 1989 that
prohibited receipt of honoraria by government employees. 129 The pe-
titioners alleged that they had lawfully received compensation for
speaking or writing before the passage of the Reform Act, which
banned receipt of honoraria. 130 The District Court held that because
Congress had been concerned about the appearance of impropriety
among its own members, the honoraria prohibition as applied to ex-
ecutive branch employees was severable from the ban upon the spe-
cific parties seeking relief.13 1
The Court of Appeals affirmed, noting that the denial of compen-
sation placed a heavy burden on the government employees.13 2 Ulti-
mately, the Supreme Court weighed in, holding for the plaintiffs and
emphasizing that the employees sought compensation "for their ex-
pressive activities in their capacity as citizens, not as Government
employees." 133
126 Victor Williams, Third Branch Independence and Integrity Threatened by Political Branch
Irresponsibility: Reviewing the Report of the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and
Removal, 5 SETON HALL CONST. LJ. 851, 903 (1995) (footnotes omitted).
127 513 U.S. 454 (1995).
128 "The General Schedule, abbreviated 'GS,' is the basic pay schedule for employees
of the Federal Government." Id. at 459 n.2.
129 Id. at 461.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 462.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 465.
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The plaintiffs submitted affidavits describing activities for which
they had received compensation prior to the enactment of the hono-
raria ban. For example, the affidavits described that "[a] mail handler
employed by the Postal Service... had given lectures on the Quaker
religion for which he received small payments.... [and a] microbiolo-
gist at the Food and Drug Administration had earned almost $3,000
per year writing articles and making radio and television appearances
reviewing dance performances."1 3 4 The Court held that the ban im-
posed a significant burden on expressive activity by chilling potential
speech before it occurred, thus increasing the government's burden
to prove that its interest outweighed the employees' speech inter-
ests.135 The Court further held that while "operational efficiency is
undoubtedly a vital governmental interest ... several features of the
honoraria ban's text cast serious doubt on the Government's submis-
sion that Congress perceived honoraria as so threatening to the effi-
ciency of the entire federal service as to render the ban a reasonable
response to the threat."13 6
The Court recognized that the employees who contested the pro-
hibition were low-level executive-branch employees who did not en-
gage in work-related activities, and that Congress did not intend the
prohibition to sweep so broadly.137 Given that this judicially crafted
exception does not appear within or necessarily follow from the text
of the statute, whether the same logic would ultimately apply to the
avocational activities of high-ranking government officials or federal
judges is unclear.'38 In this case, however, the government's interest
was insufficient to satisfy the heightened burden created by singling
out expressive activity for special regulation. 139
The Court declared that a total ban on the paid speech of these
executive branch employees was unconstitutional, and that therefore
these employees could continue to receive honoraria for public speak-
ing engagements. 140 Still, the Court specifically declined either to
overturn the law or to preclude the application of its ban on honora-
ria for higher-level officials and members of the other branches of the
U.S. government.14' Pertinently, the Court enunciated that its "policy
134 Id at 461.
135 See id. at 468.
136 Id. at 473.
137 See id. at 472-73 (acknowledging that the government does not have a sufficiently
strong interest in limiting the speech of rank-and-file employees).
138 See id. at 473 ("Congress reasonably could assume that payments of honoraria to
judges or high-ranking officials in the Executive branch might generate [an] ... appear-
ance of improper influence.").
'39 Id. at 475-76 (citations omitted).
140 Id. at 477-78.
141 Id.
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of avoiding unnecessary adjudication of constitutional issues"'142 pre-
vented it from deciding whether 5 U.S.C. app. § 501 (b) applies to ex-
ecutive-branch employees above grade GS-16143 or to members of the
judicial branch.144 It is from this precedential context that Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist recently asked Congress to pass legislation that will di-
rectly increase judicial salaries. 14 5
Surprisingly, ChiefJustice Rehnquist did not concur with the ma-
jority that partially overturned the honoraria ban in National Treasury
Employees Union. In fact, he dissented and voted to uphold the ban
across the board. 146 In his dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowl-
edged that public employees do not relinquish their First Amendment
rights by virtue of their employment with the government.147 He em-
phasized, however, that "the State's interests as an employer in regu-
lating the speech of its employees differ significantly from those it
possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry
in general."'148 Moreover, the Chief Justice rejected the majority's
conclusion that the ban chilled potential speech, declaring: "The ban
neither prohibits anyone from speaking or writing, nor does it penal-
ize anyone who speaks or writes; the only stricture effected by the stat-
ute is a denial of compensation.' '149
What is most interesting about the Chief Justice's dissent, how-
ever, was not his rejection of the Court's reasoning in lifting the prohi-
bition as applied to low-level executive-branch employees, but his
support of the congressional rationale in adopting the prohibition. 150
Chief Justice Rehnquist fervently agreed with the Congress as he
opined that "[t] he Court largely ignores the Government's foremost
interest-prevention of impropriety and the appearance of impropri-
ety-by focusing solely on the burdens of the statute as applied to
several carefully selected Executive Branch employees."'151 Thus, a
mere five years before his plea to Senator McConnell to repeal the
honoraria prohibition, Chief Justice Rehnquist steadfastly supported
its uniform application to all officials and employees in the govern-
142 Id. at 478 (citation omitted).
143 Id. (citations omitted).
144 Id.
145 See Charles Lane, Rehnquist Raises the Flag: Pay Judges More, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 2001,
at A17.
146 See Nat'l Treasuy Employees Union, 513 U.S. at 489 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
147 Id. at 491 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
148 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140
(1983) (quotation omitted)).
149 Id. at 490 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
150 Id. at 494 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
151 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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ment, and his reasoning applied as much to executive officers as to
judicial officers.' 52
The sting of a repeatedly unadjusted salary in prosperous eco-
nomic times may have changed ChiefJustice Rehnquist's mind,' 53 and
other federal judges were clearly becoming increasingly concerned
over their own incomes as well. In the 1999 case Williams v. United
States,154 twenty U.S. district court judges sought a declaratory judg-
ment that they were entitled to employment cost index (ECI) adjust-
ments under the Ethics Reform Act of 1989.155 In an attempt to
provide for the automatic increase ofjudicial salaries, the Ref6rm Act
amended the Executive Salary Cost-of-Living Adjustment Act 56 to re-
quire that Congress annually adjust the salary of federal judges pursu-
ant to an index set forth in the Reform Act.' 57 In Williams, the
Reform Act imposed one condition: whenever a pay-rate adjustment
was made for judges, there must be a commensurate adjustment in
the rates of pay of positions of most federal employees in order to
reflect increases in the cost of living and salary increases in the private
sector.1 58 The district court observed that in keeping with this new
formula, Congress had adjusted the salaries of federal judges on the
first days of January 1991, 1992, and 1993.159 The district court fur-
ther observed that in 1994, however, the scheme broke down: Con-
gress had not made an adjustment to the salaries of General Schedule
employees, and consequently it made no adjustment for thejudges. 60
Furthermore, from 1995 through 1997 General Schedule employees
152 One plausible interpretation of Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent in National Trea-
suy Employees Union is his reluctance to encroach on Congress's policymaking authority.
The ChiefJustice begins his dissent by stating that "the Court's opinion is seriously flaved
... its application of the First Amendment understates the weight that should be accorded
to the governmental justifications for the honoraria ban and overstates the amount of
speech that actually will be deterred." Id. at 489 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
153 See Robert S. Bennett, Pay Scales ofJustic, WAsH. Posr, Feb. 19, 2001, at A33.
154 48 F. Supp. 2d 52 (D.D.C. 1999), rev'd, 240 F.3d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
122'S. Ct. 1221 (2002).
155 See id. at 53.
156 Pub. L. No. 94-82, 89 Stat. 419 (1975) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 5318
(2000)).
157 See Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-194, 103 Stat. 1716, 1769 (codified
as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 5318 (2000)). The district court explained:
[B]eginning in 1991 and in each subsequent year, the salary of a federal
judge shall be adjusted based upon a specific schedule and index. Under
the Act, in any year in which salaries of General Schedule employees are
adjusted under the Comparability Act, federaljudges' salaries are to be ad-
justed by an amount equal to one-half of one percent less than the percent-
age change in the ECI for the period ended December of the previous year.
48 F. Supp. 2d. at 54.
158 See id. at 53.
159 See id. at 54.
160 See id.
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received ECI adjustments, but Congress again made no adjustment
for the federal judges.1 61
Noting the importance of the issue ofjudicial compensation, the
Williams court looked to the Founding Fathers,
who were very aware of the importance of an independentjudiciary.
In Federalist No. 79, Hamilton stated that "[ n] ext to permanency in
office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of the
judges than a fixed provision for their support." He noted that
"[i]n the general course of human nature, a power over a man's
subsistence amounts to a power over his will." 16 2
Through reference to the writings of the Founding Fathers, the Wil-
liams court posited a historic basis for an understanding of the strong
influence of compensation on the judiciary and the imperative that it
come from a legitimate source. The court easily concluded that the
Reform Act granted federal judges an ECI adjustment effective at the
time of the enactment of the Reform Act in 1989, and declared that
federal judges were entitled to receive that which was promised by the
statute.163
Notably, however, the district court's judgment was reversed on
appeal, setting the stage for an even more interesting proceeding
when the judges appealed the reversal to the Supreme Court.1 64 Un-
expectedly, the Supreme Court not only denied certiorari, but three
justices took the "unusual" step of issuing a sharply worded dissent on
that denial. 165 Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion in support of the
petition, which was joined by Justices Scalia and Kennedy, went to
great lengths to illustrate the disparities between judicial and other
professional salaries.166 Intriguingly, no opinion was rendered byJus-
tice Rehnquist, whose fourth vote to grant certiorari would have made
the difference between hearing and rejecting the case. It remains un-
clear as to whether the Chief Justice simply felt more comfortable
than his colleagues with the court of appeals' disposition of the case,
or rather was unwilling to cast the fourth vote for certiorari because of
his own previous comments and actions on the subject.
161 See id.
162 Id. at 55.
163 See id. at 60.
164 Williams v. United States, 240 F.3d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct.
1221 (2002).
165 Williams v. United States, 122 S. Ct. 1221 (2002) (mem.) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
166 See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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IV
THE CuRi NT DEBATE
This Note argues that, for the numerous reasons discussed above,
Congress should not repeal the Ethics Reform Act of 1989 as it per-
tains to federaljudges. Repealing the Act will simply enhance the po-
tential for bribery or improper influence on the judiciary, thereby
creating a serious threat to the political independence and legitimacy
of federal courtjudges. Moreover, the ChiefJustice's unusual request
to Congress poses an apparent and perhaps significant conflict for the
judicial and legislative branches. By examining the motivations of the
Chief Justice in requesting the repeal, the other remedies that are
available to address the problem perceived by certain members of the
Court, and the probable consequences of repealing the prohibition, it
becomes clear that the repeal remedy is not only completely unneces-
sary, but also poses a moral hazard to the judicial branch.
After the decision in Williams and subsequent congressional ac-
tion, ChiefJustice Rehnquist published the 1999 Year-End Report on
the Federal Judiciary.167 In this report, Chief Justice Rehnquist ac-
knowledged that federal judges had received their mandated 3.4%
ECI adjustment in accordance with the Reform Act. However, the
Chief Justice was not satisfied with the ECI adjustment provided for in
the Reform Act and demanded by Williams. He stated explicitly that
"[t]he Judiciary is appreciative of the adjustment, but it should not be
confused with a raise in salary. We must continue to work for more
appropriate compensation for federal judges to maintain the quality
and morale of the federal Judiciary.' 168
In the 2000 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, the Chief
Justice again commented about the inadequacy of the current federal
judicial salary.' 69 Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist declares in the
overview to the report that he will focus "on what [he] consider[s] to
be the most pressing issue facing the Judiciary: the need to increase
judicial salaries.' 170 In contrast to his 1999 report, the Chief Justice's
2000 report specifically addressed the recent attempt to remove the
ban created by the Reform Act.171 His comment is illuminating: "This
move was met with an outcry against what some feared would create
the appearance of impropriety, even though any honoraria would be
governed by the strict standards of the Code of Conduct for United
167 William H. Rehnquist, The 1999 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, THIRD
BRANCH (Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts Office of Public Affairs),Jan. 2000, at 1 [herein-
after 1999 Report].
168 Id. at 2.
169 See 2000 Repora supra note 18, at 1.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 3; see also supra text accompanying notes 6-8 (describing the contours of the
Ethics Reform Act of 1989).
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States Judges, just as they had been before 1989."172 Apparently the
Chief Justice continues to deem lifting the prohibition a viable solu-
tion to the perceived financial burden on the judiciary, despite public
concern.
In his letter to Republican Senator McConnell, Chief Justice
Rehnquist explicitly requested that Congress lift the prohibition on
honoraria for speaking fees, at least as it applies to federal judges serv-
ing a lifetime appointment.1 73 According to one report, the language
that Senator McConnell inserted into the appropriations bill, re-
ported out-of-committee on September 8, 2000, stated that the previ-
ously announced ban "shall not apply to any individual while that
individual is a justice or judge of the United States."174 Under the
proposal prevailing at that time, although Congress would have lifted
the ban, it would have subjected honoraria to the approval and scru-
tiny of an existing judicial commission, the Federal Judicial Confer-
ence. 175 The Conference, which serves as the judiciary's own
policymaking body, apparently would have generated new guidelines
by which federal judges could earn money for public appearances,
speeches, and writings.176
According to one report, Chief Justice Rehnquist asked for the
ban's repeal because it is "sorely needed to ease the growing disparity
between the pay ofjudges and of members of the private legal profes-
sion, in which first-year salaries at blue-ribbon New York law firms are
now reaching upwards of $140,000."177 By comparison, the ChiefJus-
tice's government salary is currently $186,300,178 independent of any
amounts that might be earned through outside legal endeavors. The
prospect of increasing the amount earned from such endeavors has
dangled before judges' eyes for years. In 1995, the Supreme Court
overturned the honoraria prohibition as it applied to lower-level exec-
utive-branch employees, but purposely did not extend the holding to
senior executives in that branch, or to members of the federal judici-
ary.179 Subsequently, the U.S. District Court for the District of Colum-
bia was asked to decide a case that would automatically increase the
172 2000 Report, supra note 18, at 3.
173 See Morgan, supra note 4.
174 S. REP. No. 106-404, at 188 (2000); see Murphy, supra note 2.
175 See Morgan, supra note 4.
176 See id.
177 Id.; see also 135 CONG. REc. 29,496 (1989) (statement of Rep. Lloyd) (arguing that
an ECI adjustment for the judiciary is "particularly important to the Federal judiciary who
has lost large numbers of experienced, dedicated judges in recent years who can no longer
afford to stay in Government service").
178 See U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Judges, Magistrates, and Other
Judicial Workers, available at http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos272.htm.
179 See United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995).
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salaries of federal judges under a cost-of-living formula contained in
the Reform Act.180
Other justices have also reportedly pined for salary supplementa-
tion. The lead article by Mauro and Loewenberg detailing Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist's request 81 became the subject of an unexpected and
rare public reproach by Justice Antonin Scalia, who called the front-
page article a "mean-spirited attack upon my personal integrity"'182
and denied several statements attributed to him within. In a letter to
the editor of the Legal Times, Justice Scalia countered the attributed
statements by stating that
the honorarium ban makes no difference to me. For many years, all
of my outside earned income has come from teaching, which is not
covered by that ban, and that is the only compensable extrajudicial
activity I am interested in pursuing.... What limits my earnings
from teaching is not the honorarium ban, but the $21,195 limit on
all outside income earned byjudges. I have indeed been critical of
that arbitrary limitation .... 183
Justice Scalia similarly denied that he would leave the bench because
of the prohibition on speaking fees, claiming that he is not affected
financially by that specific prohibition. 184 Mauro and Loewenberg re-
ported, however, thatJustice Scalia had earned $37,000 from speaking
fees in 1989, the year before the ban went into effect.18 5 Notably, Jus-
tice Scalia did not address his previous receipt of honoraria in his re-
sponse to the article.'8 6
In January 2002, Chief Justice Rehnquist released the 2001 Year-
End Report on the Federal Judiciary,187 in which he again lamented
the current salary paid to federaljudges. At the top of his agenda was
a request that judicial vacancies be filled. Chief Justice Rehnquist
stated that "the relatively low pay that federal judges receive, com-
pared to the amount that a successful, experienced practicing lawyer
can make" is one cause of the current vacancies.' 88 Although recog-
nizing that judges had received a cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) in
2001, he went on to note that "a COLA only keeps judges from falling
further behind the median income of the profession."'1 9 Chief Jus-
180 See Williams v. United States, 48 F. Supp. 2d 52 (D.D.G. 1999), rev'd, 240 F.3d (Fed.
Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1221 (2002).
181 Mauro & Loewenberg, supra note 2.
182 Antonin Scalia, Scalia: Article OffBase; LEGAL TIMEs, Oct. 2, 2000, at 85 (noting, in a
letter to the editor, that the author rarely responds to erroneous reports in the media).
183 Id.
184 See id.
185 See Mauro & Loewenberg, supra note 2.
186 See Scalia, supra note 182.
187 See 2001 Repor supra note 3.
188 Id. at 2.
189 Id.
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tice Rehnquist continues to be dissatisfied with the salary of federal
judges despite the COLA increases that have been allocated, thus in-
creasing the likelihood that he may again attempt to influence the
existence of the honoraria ban.
The Supreme Court justices are not without legitimate justifica-
tion in calling for pay increases; it is the means rather than the end
that is problematic. One arguable justification for an increase in sal-
ary is the lack of qualified candidates willing to fill judicial vacancies.
Recent news reports indicate that there are currently approximately
101 unfilled federal judicial positions. 190 In his 1999 Year-End Report
on the Federal Judiciary, Chief Justice Rehnquist lamented that in
1999 only thirty-three new judges had been confirmed compared to
sixty-five the previous year. 191 Some, including Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, 192 argue that the diminutive salary offered to federal judges may
explain this drought. Whether the judicial positions remain unfilled
because of the salary size is arguable. 193 Cost-of-living increases, how-
ever, have not been enough to placate the federal judiciary; ChiefJus-
tice Rehnquist at first publicly stated that these were no substitute for
true salary increases,1 94 and then privately suggested the alternative to
Senator McConnell.
Another justification for raising salaries is the current increasing
trend in judicial caseloads. 195 According to the Chief Justice's 1999
Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, the caseloads that federal
190 See Darryl Fears, Nominee's Past Opens Old Wounds: Appeals Court Pick Raises Tempers,
Divides Black, WASH. Pos-r, Mar. 3, 2002, at A5; Kevin Galvin, Senators Balk at Judge Nomina-
tion, SEATrLE TIMES, Jan. 24, 2002, at B1.
191 See 1999 Report, supra note 167, at 1, 5.
192 See Mauro & Loewenberg, supra note 2. In his letter to Senator McConnell, Chief
Justice Rehnquist wrote: " 'Such disparity harms the ability of the judiciary to retain and
recruit the most capable lawyers from all socioeconomic classes and geographical areas,
particularly in high cost-of-livi.ng urban areas .... '" Id. Mauro and Loewenberg go on to
note that "[f]orty-two judges, an unusually high number, have left the federal bench since
1993, although money may not be the reason for all of them." Id.
193 The reason may be political; much has been made of Senate Republican long-term,
concerted efforts to prevent former President Clinton from appointing his choice of fed-
eraljudges. On the other hand, the reason may be practical. In his overview of the 1999
Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, Chief Justice Rehnquist warned that "federal
judges . . . continue to dispense justice despite an increasing workload and a relatively
decreasing salary." 1999 Report, supra note 167, at 2.
194 See 1996 Report, supra note 1, at 2.
195 One Congressman spoke out on the issue:
Since I ascended the bench in 1965, the caseload per appellate judge has
more than tripled. That for a trial judge has more than doubled and the
complexity has gone out of sight.... In addition, judges find themselves
confronted with a steady flow of new causes of action, often in complex
areas, created by a Congress that oftentimes fails to take into account what
impact they will have on thejudiciary. It is clear that if we are serious about
attracting qualified and dedicated individuals to the Federal bench we must
provide a system of adequate compensation.
135 CONG. REc. H8760 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1989) (statement of Rep. Moorhead).
1504 [Vol. 87:1475
2002] THE SUPREME COURT'S INDECENT PROPOSAL
judges must balance have risen disproportionately to their salaries.1 96
Total filings in the Supreme Court increased slightly more than 4.8%
from 1998 to 1999.197 For the same time period, there was a two per-
cent increase in total filings in the courts of appeals and a four per-
cent increase in criminal case filings in the district courts. 198 In 2000,
though the economy experienced modest inflation and the real value
of salaries therefore decreased, filings in the courts of appeal, district
courts, and in the Supreme Court remained virtually static.' 99
This Note does not challenge, based on this statistical evidence,
the fact that federal judges are working harder for less pay than their
private-sector counterparts. This Note only addresses the question of
whether judges should be compensated by the private sector in ex-
change for speaking engagements.
Alternatives to the Chief Justice's extreme proposal do exist. In
his own report, ChiefJustice Rehnquist delineates three ways that the
107th Congress could ease the financial strain on the judiciary: first,
by increasing judicial salaries by 9.6% in accordance with the fore-
gone ECI; second, by ending the tie of judicial increases to that of
non-career public servants; or third, by automating salary increases in
accordance with the Reform Act.200
There are additional options that the Chief Justice failed to ad-
dress. Although the current ban does not allow federal judges to
make money from public speaking engagements, the regulations do
permit judges to earn money from other endeavors, such as teaching
courses at accredited institutions.20' There is currently a cap on
teaching income, 20 2 but Justice Scalia's alternative to Chief Justice
Rehnquist's current proposal would include raising the maximum
amount. One other alternative entails setting up an annual fund simi-
lar to that of the Quadrennial Commission, empowered to review in-
flation rates, private sector salary changes and other conditions, and
then to match salary increases against these factors.203
Perhaps the most dramatic alternative would be to take ChiefJus-
tice Rehnquist's requests with a grain of salt. Many have accepted
without argument the comparison between private-sector associate
employment and public-sector judicial employment, when in fact the
two occupations are different in many ways. First, and perhaps most
significantly in times of recession, is the almost complete employment
196 See 1999 Report, supra note 167, at 4-5.
197 Id. at 5.
198 Id. at 4.
199 See 2000 Report, supra note 18, at 5.
200 Id. at 3.
201 See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 182 (discussing the justice's earnings from teaching).
202 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
203 See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
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security enjoyed by federal judges. Unlike associates at large firms,
judges are insulated from economic slowdown and cannot be laid off.
Second, judges are given staffs in order to do most of their legal re-
search, particularly at the federal level. Judges operate at a high level
of abstraction; associates, on the other hand, must do their own re-
search and writing, not to mention work past government business
hours and late into the night. One last major difference that should
not be overlooked is the intangible benefit that comes with the posi-
tion of a judge. Judicial positions bring with them the prestige and
power of ajob that is relatively rare, highly sought after, and accords a
fair amount of independence.
Let us also not forget that the lifetime position pays quite well at
$186,300 for the Chief Justice, $178,300 per year for the eight associ-
ate justices, and federal appellate court judges and district judges are
paid $150,000 and $141,300, respectively, in addition to the outside
perks they receive because they are federal judges.20 4 This may not
seem like a lot for lawyers, but it is a significantly greater salary than
that of other professionals. Although justices may not be paid for
speaking engagements, at a minimum their traveling and accommo-
dation expenses can be paid for by whomever invites them to speak.20 5
Additionally, the federal judiciary began its protests during a period of
unprecedented change in attorney salaries, buoyed at least in part by
the threat of attorney flight from private firms into well-financed
emerging-growth companies. Now, in the midst of an economic reces-
sion, and commensurate layoffs of highly paid attorneys from both the
emerging-growth companies and competing law firms, first-year asso-
ciate salaries may well fall, and jobs will certainly disappear. Federal
judges, by contrast, will never see their salaries decreased, and need
never leave their judicial posts. 20 6
The 1989 honoraria ban was intended to rid the judiciary of alle-
gations that corporations and interest groups were using speaking en-
gagement payments to lobby or influence federal officials. In the
absence of the prohibition, federal courts most likely will face new
allegations of impropriety and impartiality. Indeed, one organization
is already predicting that "'[c]ompanies will be lining up to cut the
judges' checks."' 207 Such public perception can do nothing less than
undermine the legitimacy of the judicial branch.
204 See supra note 178; Morgan, supra note 4.
205 See supra note 83.
206 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (stating thatjudges "shall hold their offices during good
behavior, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a compensation, which shall
not be diminished during their continuance in office").
207 Morgan, supra note 4 (quoting Mike Casey, vice president of the Environmental
Working Group).
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The current state of the legislation that would lift the ban on re-
ceipt of honoraria is uncertain. The Senate approved the repeal of
the ban as a part of a recent spending bill, but the House did not.208
Thus, the provision that would have ended the prohibition on receipt
of honoraria has, for the moment, been dropped from formal consid-
eration by Congress.20 9 The issue is now under consideration by a
House-Senate conference committee for inclusion in a future appro-
priations bill.2 10
CONCLUSION
Though this Note has focused on the writings of two prominent
Supreme Court justices, their views on the receipt of honoraria are
not necessarily representative of the views of the entire Court. Justice
Stephen Breyer, for example, has written forcefully in support of con-
gressional regulation of outside judicial income, including honoraria:
Ajudge must insulate himself or herself from financial bias. ... To
help in this process of self-reflection and recusal, as well as to pro-
vide some basis for oversight of the decisions judges make, Congress
has imposed rules that regulate... any outside employment, earned
income, activities, gifts, and honoraria that judges may receive.
These requirements facilitate both awareness and accountability of
judges with respect to the possibility of prejudice or conflicts of in-
terest. These rules of recusal, and the degree to which judges con-
scientiously follow them to avoid conflicts of interest and prejudice,
are central to assuring the independence of judging from the cir-
cumstances of the judge, as well as to assuring the perception of the
integrity of the judiciary in the eyes of the public over whom these
judges hold so much power for so long a tenure.21'
Other federal judges have voiced similar support for the current ban.
Senior Judge Jack Weinstein of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of New York wrote in 1994 that "[t]he present statute and reg-
ulations on earnings by judges seem like a useful compromise be-
tween unrestricted rights to earn extra income by lecturing and a
complete prohibition. 212
The drafting and passage of the Ethics in Government Act of
1978 and the Ethics Reform Act of 1989 were hardly accidental; the
modifications made by the latter act were perceived as necessary when
passed, and have been upheld by a Supreme Court that easily could
208 David G. Savage, Wrath of Scalia on Honorarium Story, L.A. TiiMs, Oct. 3, 2000, at AS.
209 See id.
210 See id.
211 Stephen G. BreyerJudicial Independence in the United States, 40 ST. Louis U. LJ. 989,
994 (1996).
212 Jack B. Weinstein, Limits on Judges Learning Speaking and Acting-Part I-Tentative
First Thoughts: How May Judges Learn. 36 Aniz. L. Rnv. 539, 551 & n.70 (1994).
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have found grounds to address the law's universal applicability. To-
day, after twelve years of experience with the Reform Act, and despite
many other criticisms of the U.S. justice system, the federal judiciary
has not been accused of widespread corruption. The honoraria ban is
an integral part of preserving the perceived independence of the judi-
ciary and therefore should not be repealed as it pertains to federal
judges. Any potential for bribery or improper influence upon the ju-
diciary is a serious threat to the political independence and legitimacy
of federal court judges. Moreover, the ChiefJustice's unusual request
to Congress in itself poses a significant conflict for the judicial and
legislative branches; for Congress to follow the judiciary's request for
.outside supplementation of income would, at the very least, itself carry
the appearance of impropriety. Although one can hardly claim that
federal judges are not entitled to a salary increase, allowing an excep-
tion to the prohibition on honoraria for federal judges is not an ap-
propriate means to properly compensate our judges.
